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Simplified Biased Contribution Index (SBCI): A
Mechanism to Make P2P Network Fair and
Efficient for Resource Sharing
Sateesh Kumar Awasthi, Yatindra Nath Singh, Senior Member, IEEE,
Abstract—To balance the load and to discourage the free-riding in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, many incentive mechanisms and
policies have been proposed in recent years. Global peer ranking is one such mechanism. In this mechanism, peers are ranked based
on a metric called contribution index. Contribution index is defined in such a manner that peers are motivated to share the resources in
the network. Fairness in the terms of upload to download ratio in each peer can be achieved by this method. However, calculation of
contribution index is not trivial. It is computed distributively and iteratively in the entire network and requires strict clock synchronization
among the peers. A very small error in clock synchronization may lead to wrong results. Furthermore, iterative calculation requires a lot
of message overhead and storage capacity, which makes its implementation more complex. In this paper, we are proposing a simple
incentive mechanism based on the contributions of peers, which can balance the upload and download amount of resources in each
peer. It does not require iterative calculation, therefore, can be implemented with lesser message overhead and storage capacity
without requiring strict clock synchronization. This approach is efficient as there are very less rejections among the cooperative peers.
It can be implemented in a truly distributed fashion with O(N) time complexity per peer.
Index Terms—P2P network, free-rider, DHT.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
P EER-TO-PEER (P2P) networks gained a significant pop-ularity in the last decade and now responsible for a
large fraction of internet traffic [1], [2]. The popularity of
these networks is due to their inherent advantages over
traditional client-server model, e.g., the diversity of avail-
able data, scalability, robustness and cost effectiveness. The
initial setup cost for these networks is very small because
costly central servers are not needed. However, lack of
central control leads to the problem of unfairness in these
networks, i.e., large difference between upload and down-
load amount at any peer. In such a situation, many peers
free-ride and contribute very less or nothing which results
in slow downloads for other peers [3]. Therefore, designing
and implementing an efficient incentive policy to motivate
the peers to share the resources becomes important.
In recent years, many incentive policies have been pro-
posed to maintain the fairness in P2P networks [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9]. In these policies, peers’ cooperative behavior in
the network is evaluated and resources are given to them in
proportion to their cooperation.
In [7], [8], [9], peers’ cooperation is evaluated locally, i.e.,
peer cooperate with only those peers who had cooperated
with them in the past. To start the process of sharing, a small
amount of data is given to every peer. In such scenario,
free-riders can always find a new peer to download their
desired data. Also, the cooperative peers are not allowed to
download more than this small amount of data from a new
peer even though they have uploaded the large amount of
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data to some other peers [4].
In [4], [5], [6], peers’ cooperative behavior in the entire
network is taken into consideration. For this purpose, in [6],
every peer keeps the record of each transaction which has
happened in the entire network. It makes the implementa-
tion of algorithm very complex. In comparison to this, [4],
[5] are simpler approaches. In these approaches, peers are
ranked in the entire network. The rank of the peer is deter-
mined by the contribution index. It is estimated using two
factors, resources contributed by the peer in the network
and contribution index of peer with whom it is transacting.
Estimation of contribution index is performed by iterative
methods and can be implemented in a distributed fashion.
These approaches are able to balance the amount of upload
and download of resources in the network. However, there
are some fundamental problems in its implementation.
First, in each iteration, index managers, i.e., peers who
are managing the contribution index of other peers, need
the current contribution index of peers from other peers. If
clocks of the peers are not synchronized, then the peers who
are reporting the contribution index of peers may report the
contribution index of the previous iteration, which may lead
to the wrong estimates [10].
Second, updating the contribution index in each iteration
requires a lot of message overhead. This is more important
when the number of iterations required to converge the al-
gorithm is large. If new transactions happen in the network,
then contribution index need to be updated. Even one trans-
action, between any two peers, can affect the contribution
index of all the peers in the network.
And lastly, index managers need to keep the record of
all past transactions of a peer for whom they are estimating
the contribution index. This needs a large amount of storage
2capacity. Keeping all these points in view, a simple incentive
policy is required, which can ensure the following:
• It should balance the upload and download amount
of resources at each peer.
• There must be minimum rejections among the coop-
erative peers.
• Cooperation of peers must be considered in the entire
network.
• Lower message overhead and storage capacity is
desirable.
• It should be robust to peer dynamics.
• It should be implementable in truly distributed sys-
tem.
In this paper, we are proposing an incentive policy, which
considers peers’ cooperation in the entire network. We are
assigning the contribution index to each peer. It is a sim-
plified form of the Biased Contribution Index (BCI) [5]. We
call it Simplified Biased Contribution Index (SBCI). It also
depends on the cooperation of peers in sharing the resources
and in balancing the load in the network. SBCI is updated
at regular time intervals. At any time, SBCI is calculated
using previous SBCI and the cooperation made by the
peers during this period, i.e., in between previous update
to current update. In the estimation of SBCI, no iterative
calculation is required, hence it automatically solves the
first and second problems. Once the peers’ cooperation is
modeled in terms of SBCI, it need not store the history of
peers’ transactions, hence, it also solves the last problem.
Our simulation results show that SBCI can balance the
upload and download amount at each peer with minimum
rejections among cooperative peers. Hence it meets all the
above design considerations.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
covers the summary of related work. The proposed in-
centive model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 covers
the analysis of algorithm. The transaction procedure for
maximum efficiency is introduced in Section 5. Evaluation
of algorithm, through simulation is discussed in Section 6.
Finally, paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
Presence of free-riding peers and its impact on fairness in
P2P network have been studied earlier also [3], [11]. Several
approaches have been proposed by the research community
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19].
BitTorrent [20], a most popular file sharing system,
used tit-for-tat (TFT) approach to prevent the free-riding.
In this approach, a peer cooperates with other peers in
the same proportion as they have cooperated with him in
the previous round. In each round, every peer updates the
contributions of peers in the previous round. To improve
the performance, many variants of TFT have been proposed.
Garbacki et al., [7], proposed ATFT in which bandwidth is
used rather than content to decide the incentives. Dave et
al., [21], proposed auction based model to improve the TFT.
In this model, peers reward one another with proportional
shares, [22], of bandwidth. Sherman et al., [16], proposed
FairTorrent. It is a deficit based distributed algorithm in
which a peer uploads the next data block to the peer, whom
it owes the most data as measured by a deficit counter. In
Give-to-get [9], peer ranks all its neighbors, based on the
amount of data what have been received from them in the
last round and then unchokes the top three forwarders. All
these mechanisms consider the local and very short history
of peers’ cooperation.
Global history of peers’ cooperation is considered in [4],
[5], [6], [8]. In multilevel tit-for-tat (ML-TFT) [8], a peer ranks
other peers based on the fraction of download, what he
received from them. Its time complexity is much larger for n-
step ranking of peers. Feldman et al., [6], proposed a robust
incentive technique, which considers the peers’ cooperation
in the entire network, but it is not trivial to implement in a
large network. Its calculation have complexity of O(N3). In
Global Contribution (GC) approach [4], a peers’ GC point is
defined such that all peers are motivated to download from
low contributing peers and upload to high contributing
peers. GC point is calculated using iterative methods such
as the Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel. In another similar approach,
Biased Contribution Index(BCI) [5], second order iterative
function is used to calculate the BCI of peers. BCI is defined
as monotonically increasing function of biased upload to
download ratio. Convergence of BCI [5] is faster than GC
[4].
Many authors proposed approaches based on game the-
ory [15], [17], [18], [19]. Free-riding can be reduced by this
approach. This approach is based on the assumption that
the rules of the game are known to all the players. For
practically large network, this may not be true for all the
peers.
Reputation management system, [23], [24], [25], [26], is
another approach in which peers’ behavior is modeled as
trust. Trust is estimated by each peer based on its interaction
with the other peers and then it is aggregated in the whole
network. Trust is a more generalized term and depends on
the overall behavior of peer in the network. In the proposed
SBCI, we are focusing on the particular issues of fairness
and free-riding.
3 PROPOSED INCENTIVE MODEL
3.1 Design Rules to Ensure the Fair and Efficient P2P
Network
Let us make some design rules to ensure the design consid-
erations mentioned in Section 1.
1). If any peer only downloads the resources from the
network then its SBCI must be zero.
2). If it only uploads to the network ( at least once to other
than free-rider) then its SBCI must be 1.
3). Uploading to the free-riders should not increase the SBCI.
4). Uploading to any other peer should always increase the
SBCI.
5). Download should always decrease the SBCI.
6). Peers must be motivated to upload to high contributing
peers.
7). Peers must be motivated to download from low con-
tributing peers.
33.2 Simplified Biased Contribution Index
Let there be N peers in a P2P network. Further, we consid-
ered time evolution in discrete instances. A time instance
is represented by tn, and if an event happened in the time
interval, (tn−1, tn], it is considered to happen at tn. At any
time, tn, let the share matrix in the entire network be S(tn).
Where its ij element is the amount of resource shared by
peer i to peer j at time tn, i.e., in (tn−1, tn]. The bias ratio,
Ri(tn), for peer i at time tn can be defined in the similar
way as in [5].
Ri(tn) =
ei.S(tn).x(tn)
ei.Str(tn).x(tn)
(1)
Here, x(tn) is the SBCI vector of peers at time tn. S
tr(tn) is
transpose of matrix S(tn) and ei is a row vector with its i
th
entry as 1 and all others as zero. Now, let us define the SBCI,
xi(tn), of peer i as a monotonically increasing function of
the bias ratio at time tn−1.
xi(tn) =
Ri(tn−1)
1 +Ri(tn−1)
=
ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1)
ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) + ei.Str(tn−1).x(tn−1)
(2)
If any peer i does not upload anything in the net-
work at time tn−1, then ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) = 0. But if
it download something from the network at this time,
then ei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1) 6= 0 only if x(tn−1) 6= 0.
Therefore, to make the denominator in (2) nonzero for
zero uploading and nonzero downloading, let us replace
ei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1) by αei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1) + (1 −
α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e. Here, α ∈ (0, 1) is constant and e is a
column vector with each element as 1. Hence, (2) will be:
xi(tn) = [ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1)]/[ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1)+
αei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1) + (1− α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e].
(3)
SBCI in the above equation is estimated using the transac-
tions, which are happening only at time tn−1. If we consider
all the past transactions, then SBCI can be modified as:
xi(tn) = (1− βi(tn−1))xi(tn−1)+
βi(tn−1)[ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1)]/[ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1)+
αei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1) + (1− α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e].
(4)
If peer i does not participate in any transaction at time tn−1,
then xi(tn) should be xi(tn−1). Parameter βi(tn−1) can be
decided by the fraction of transaction, which are happening
at time, tn−1, at node i, and can be defined as:
βi(tn−1) =
{
0, if Aui = 0.
ei.[S(tn−1)+S
tr(tn−1)].e
ei.[Scomp(tn−1)+Strcomp(tn−1)].e
, otherwise
(5)
Here, Aui = ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) + ei.S
tr(tn−1).e. The
Scomp(tn−1) is a complete share matrix with its ij element
as the amount of resources shared by peer i to peer j, till
time tn−1. To start the process of sharing, the SBCI vector
can be initialized as, x(0) = α/(1 + α)e, later we will see
that this choice of initialization will balance the upload and
download amounts in the network.
3.3 Justification For Design Rules
If any peer i, does not upload anything and only down-
load the resources from the network at time tn−1, then
ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) = 0 and ei.S
tr(tn−1).e 6= 0, hence,
from (4),
xi(tn) = (1 − βi(tn−1))xi(tn−1)
Let it did not upload anything in the network till time tn,
and started downloading the resource first time at time tm,
then from (5), βi(tm) = 1, hence
xi(tn) = (1−βi(tn−1))(1−βi(tn−2))...(1−βi(tm))xi(tm) = 0.
Therefore, if any peer i, only downloads from the network
then its SBCI will be zero.
At time tn−1, if any peer i uploads only to the free-riders,
i.e., peers who only download without uploading anything
in the network, then ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) = 0, if it does not
download anything at this time, tn−1, then ei.S
tr(tn−1).e =
0. Therefore, Aui = 0, and hence from (5), βi(tn−1) = 0, and
from (4)
xi(tn) = xi(tn−1)
Therefore, uploading to the free-riders will not increase
the SBCI.
At time tm−1, if any peer i, only uploads the re-
sources in the network (at least one of the downloader
should be other than free-rider) and does not download
anything from it then, ei.S(tm−1).x(tm−1) 6= 0 and
αei.S
tr(tm−1).x(tm−1)+(1−α)ei.S
tr(tm−1).e = 0. Hence
from (4),
xi(tm) = (1− βi(tm−1))xi(tm−1) + βi(tm−1)
Let it is first time when the peer i makes any transaction in
the network, then from (5), βi(tm−1) = 1. Hence,
xi(tm) = 0.xi(tm−1) + βi(tm−1) = βi(tm−1) = 1
Now, at time tm, if it does not participate in any transaction
then
xi(tm+1) = xi(tm) = 1
if it uploads to only free-riders and does not download
anything then again
xi(tm+1) = xi(tm) = 1
if it uploads to at least one of the peer other than free-rider
without downloading anything then,
xi(tm+1) = (1− βi(tm))xi(tm) + βi(tm)
= (1− βi(tm))1 + βi(tm) = 1.
Hence, from mathematical induction, we can say that this is
true for any n thus, xi(tn) = 1
Therefore, if any peer i, only uploads to the network (at
least once to other than free-rider) then its SBCI will be 1.
If any peer i, uploads the resources to non-free-
rider peer, at time tn−1, then ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) 6= 0.
If it does not download anything at this time then,
αei.S
tr(tn−1).x(tn−1)+ (1−α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = 0. Hence,
from (4),
xi(tn) = (1− βi(tn−1))xi(tn−1) + βi(tn−1)
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Fig. 1: Upload and download at each peer at time t = 0
It is a convex combination of 1 and xi(tn−1) hence,
xi(tn−1) < xi(tn) < 1 ∀βi(tn−1) ∈ (0, 1)
Therefore, uploading to the peer other than free-rider will
always increase the SBCI.
If any peer i, downloads the resource from the network
at time tn−1, then ei.S
tr(tn−1).e 6= 0, hence Au 6= 0, there-
fore, from (5), βi(tn−1) > 0. If it does not upload anything
in the network at this time, then ei.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) = 0,
hence from (4)
xi(tn) = (1− βi(tn−1))xi(tn−1) + βi(tn−1).0
= (1 − βi(tn−1))xi(tn−1)
hence,
xi(tn) < xi(tn−1)
Therefore, download will always decrease the SBCI.
It can be concluded from the above discussion that high
contributions will lead to high SBCI. Now, observing di-
rectly the (4), if peers will upload the resources to high SBCI
peers then, they will earn more SBCI. Therefore, peers will
be motivated to upload the resources to high contributing
peers.
It can also be observed from (4) that peers will lose
less SBCI, if they will download from a low SBCI peer.
Therefore, peers will be motivated to download from low
contributing peers.
Let us understand the SBCI and its computation through
an example. Let there be five peers A, B, C, D and E in a P2P
network as shown in Fig. 1. If α = 0.9, then initial SBCI of
all the peers will be α/(1 + α) = 0.4737. At time t = 0, let
they share the resources as shown in figure, i.e., S12(0) =
100, S13(0) = 200, S25(0) = 100, S32(0) = 100, S34(0) =
200, S41(0) = 100, S51(0) = 200, S54(0) = 100 and all oth-
ers are zero. Since, it is initial step, hence, for all i, βi(0) = 1.
Using (4), SBCI vector at time t = 1, can be calculated as,
x(1) = [0.4737, 0.3103, 0.5745, 0.2308, 0.7297]t.
Now, let peer 1 needs the data amount of 100 units and
all the four peers responded to his query, then peer 1 will
select the peer with least SBCI as an uploader, in this case,
peer 4 has least SBCI. After this transaction, let SBCI vector
is updated at t = 2. For t = 1, S41(1) = 100 and all others
are zero. Hence for this time, β1(1) = 1/7, β2(1) = β3(1) =
β5(1) = 0 and β4(1) = 1/5. Hence, updated SBCI vector
will be, x(2) = [0.4060, 0.3103, 0.5745, 0.3846, 0.7297]t.
3.4 Justification For Fairness
Lemma 1. At any time tn−1, if upload and download at each
peer is same and SBCI vector, x(tn−1) = α/(1 + α)e, then
SBCI vector, x(tn) = x(tn−1).
Proof. Let upload and download for any peer i at time tn−1
be Ti(tn−1), then
ei.Si(tn−1).e = ei.S
tr
i (tn−1).e = Ti(tn−1).
Since, x(tn−1) = α/(1 + α)e = ae, here, a = α/(1 + α),
hence from (4),
xi(tn) = (1− βi(tn−1))a+
βi(tn−1)[aei.S(tn−1).e]/[aei.S(tn−1).e+
αaei.S
tr(tn−1).e+ (1 − α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e]
= (1− βi(tn−1))a+
βi(tn−1)[aTi(tn−1)]/[Ti(tn−1)(a+ αa+ (1− α)]
= (1 − βi(tn−1))a+ βi(tn−1)a/(a(1 + α) + (1− α))
Put a = α/(1 + α), hence
xi(tn) = (1− βi(tn−1))a+ βi(tn−1)a = a ∀i
Lemma 2. If SBCI vector at any two successive time instances,
tn−1 and tn, is same and lie on vector e, then upload and
download at time tn−1 will be same in each peer.
Proof. Let x(tn) = x(tn−1) = ae, where a is any constant,
then from (4)
a = (1− βi(tn−1))a+
βi(tn−1)[aei.S(tn−1).e]/[aei.S(tn−1).e+
αaei.S
tr(tn−1).e+ (1 − α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e].
Manipulating above, we get
aβi(tn−1) = aβi(tn−1)[ei.S(tn−1).e]/[aei.S(tn−1).e+
αaei.S
tr(tn−1).e+ (1 − α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e].
For nonzero aβi(tn−1),
aei.S(tn−1).e+(aα+1−α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = ei.S(tn−1).e.
Solving,
(aα+ 1− α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = (1− a)ei.S(tn−1).e ∀i (6)
Since, i = 1, 2, ..., N , hence this set of N equations can be
written in the form of matrix as follows,
(aα+ 1− α)Str(tn−1).e = (1− a)S(tn−1).e
Pre-multiplying by etr on both sides,
(aα+ 1− α)etr.Str(tn−1).e = (1− a)e
tr.S(tn−1).e
for any matrix, S(tn−1), e
tr.S(tn−1).ewill be the sum of all
of its elements, hence etr.S(tn−1).e = e
tr.Str(tn−1).e = T
hence,
(aα+ 1− α)T = (1 − a)T
since T 6= 0 hence,
a =
α
1 + α
5Substituting the value of a in (6)
(
α2
1 + α
+ 1− α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = (1−
α
1 + α
)ei.S(tn−1).e
or
(1 + α)ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = (1 + α)ei.S(tn−1).e
since α ∈ (0, 1), hence
ei.S
tr(tn−1).e = ei.S(tn−1).e ∀i
Hence, upload and download at time tn−1 will be same in
each peer i.
4 ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM
4.1 Implementation in Distributed System
SBCI of each peer can be calculated distributively as shown
in Algorithm 1. Each peer’s SBCI can be calculated and
managed by some other peer in the network. We call it index
manager and the peer whose SBCI is being calculated by this
peer is called its daughter peer. The index manager peer can
be located using distributed hash table (DHT) such as Chord
[27], CAN [28], Pastry [29] and Tapestry [30]. Each peer i
will send the values of resources uploaded and downloaded
to and from other peer j to the index manager of peer j.
An index manager peer will collect the values of resources
uploaded and downloaded by its daughter peer k, to other
peers. Each index manager will locate the index manager of
peer j and will receive the current SBCI, xj(tn−1), of peer j.
Now each index manager possesses all the things to cal-
culate the SBCI of its daughter peer using (4). The βk(tn−1)
can be calculated using (5). If Au = 0 then it is zero,
otherwise it is just a ratio of the current transaction amount
to the total transaction amount made by peer k, till time
tn−1. The total amount of transactions can be updated by
adding the current amount of transaction with the previous
total amount of transactions.
4.2 Message Overhead, Storage Capacity and Time
Complexity
In this method, the SBCI is calculated directly while in
other similar approaches [4], [5] iterative calculations are
required. Therefore, the total number of messages required
to calculate the SBCI, in this method will be I1 and I2 times
lesser than [4] and [5] respectively. Where I1 and I2 is the
number of iterations required to converge the algorithm in
[4] and [5] respectively.
In this algorithm, index manager needs to store only
two information about its daughter peer, i.e., current SBCI
and total amount of transaction till tn−1. While in [4], [5],
all transaction history of its daughter peer, i.e., amount
of transaction, ID of peer with whom it transacted and
whether it was upload or download, are required to be
stored. Therefore, the required amount of storage is reduced
very much.
Time complexity of algorithm for one update can be
calculated directly from (5). It will be O(N) per peer which
is same as in [4] and [5].
Algorithm 1 For Updating the SBCI of Peers
1: Input: Amount of upload and download of peers
2: Output: SBCI with index managers
3: procedure
4: for each peer i do
5: forall peer j, who is selected as source peer do
6: Download the resource
7: Send the value of resource to the index man-
ager of peer j;
8: end forall
9: forall peer j, who selected peer i as source peer
do
10: Upload the resource
11: Send the value of resource to the index man-
ager of peer j;
12: end forall
13: if Peer i is index manager of peer k then
14: forall peer j, who transacted with peer k do
15: Receive the value of resource uploaded
Skj(tn−1);
16: Receive the value of resource downloaded
Sjk(tn−1);
17: if t = 0 then
18: \\ Initialization of parameters
19: Set x(0) = (α/(1 + α))e;
20: else
21: Locate jth peer’s index manager;
22: Receive the current SBCI, xj(tn−1) of
peer j from these index managers ;
23: end if
24: end forall
25: \\ Initialization of the amount of total trans-
actions
26: Set T trk(0) = 0
27: Compute
28: Auk = ek.S(tn−1).x(tn−1) + ek.S
tr(tn−1).e
29: if Auk = 0 then
30: βk(tn−1) = 0
31: else
32: δT trk(tn−1) =
ek.(S(tn−1) + S
tr(tn−1)).e
33: T trk(tn−1) = T trk(tn−2) + δT trk(tn−1)
34: βk(tn−1) =
δTtrk(tn−1)
Ttrk(tn−1)
35: end if
36: Compute xk(tn) using (4)
37: Save xk(tn)
38: Save T trk(tn−1)
39: end if
40: end for
41: end procedure
65 TRANSACTION PROCEDURE FOR MAXIMUM EF-
FICIENCY
5.1 Simple Procedure For Peer Selection
All the peers are rational and aware of the fact that, if they
will share their resources with peer having high SBCI, then
their SBCI will be higher, and if they will download from
a low SBCI peer then they will lose less SBCI. Therefore,
the simple peer selection procedure for any peer i is to
download from low SBCI peer and to upload to high SBCI
peer, as far as possible, as shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Simple Procedure for Peer Selection
1: procedure
2: if Peer i needs a resource then
3: Send the request for resource;
4: Get the SBCI of responding peers from their
respective index managers;
5: Select the source peer having minimum SBCI;
6: Download the resource;
7: Send the value of resource to the index manager
of source peer;
8: end if
9: if Peer i get a request for a resource then
10: Get the SBCI of requesting peer from their respec-
tive index managers;
11: if SBCI of all requesting peer is less than the
threshold then
12: Reject all the requesting peers;
13: else
14: Select the peer with maximum SBCI;
15: Upload the resource;
16: Send the value of resource to the index man-
ager of downloading peer;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end procedure
5.2 College Admission and The Stability of Marriage
Based Approach For Peer Selection
5.2.1 Preliminaries
College Admission and the stability of Marriage is a well-
known problem, introduced by Gale and Shapley [31]. In
its most popular variants, there are two disjoint sets of
cardinality, n. One set is representing the men and the other
one is representing the women. Each person has a different
order of preference for his or her marriage partner. There
are several ways by which one-to-one pairing can be done.
But a pairing is said to be stable, if there is no pair both of
whom prefer each other to their actual partner.
Gale and Shapley [31] provide the solution and the
algorithm for stable pairing. They also proved that there
always exists a stable match for such type of problem. In
this algorithm, one of the group proposes his or her first
preference, another group can reject the proposal or can
keep it on hold until they get a better option. If any member
from the proposing group get rejected, he or she tries on next
preference. This process continues until proposing group is
not rejected or rejected by all of his or her preferred partners.
If a proposal is given by men, then they get the better
preferred partner as compared to any other stable pairing,
hence it is called man optimal stable matching, the other
way around women optimal stable matching.
5.2.2 Application in Peer Selection
We considered the situationwhere there are many uploaders
and many downloaders for a resource. In order to earn
the high SBCI, uploader would like to upload the resource
to high SBCI peers, thus they have certain preferences
for downloaders. On the other hand, for downloaders the
resource and the SBCI both matter. Therefore, downloader
may prefer the higher bandwidth uploader over low SBCI
uploader. Thus, downloder have a different preference order
for uploaders.
In this situation, all uploaders and downloaders prefer-
ence order can be collected at a certain node. We call it the
resource manager node. This node can be found by hashing
the resource identifier and finding corresponding root node
in DHT network. On this node, the stable marriage algo-
rithm can be used to pair the uploaders and downloaders.
A message to each pair will be sent after pairing, so that they
can start the process of transaction. Detail of peer selection
procedure in this situation is shown in Algorithm 3.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
As in [32] and [33], we used NetLogo 5.2 [34], to evaluate
the performance of our algorithm. NetLogo is a multiagent
programmable modeling environment where we can model
different agents and can ask them to perform the task in
parallel and independently. It is written mostly in Scala,
with some parts in Java.
6.1 Simulation Setup
We simulated a typical P2P network with parameters and
distributions taken from real world measurements as in
[35], [36]. In this network, peers can send a query for the
resource. We assumed that ten percent of peers respond to
this query. After selecting the source peer according to the
procedure described in Section 5, resource is downloaded.
We assumed the amount of resources requested by down-
loading peers varies randomly between 1 unit to 255 units.
After downloading the resource, SBCI of peer is updated by
an index manager using (4). Any peer whose SBCI is less
than the threshold value is rejected and cannot download
the resources from the network. We assumed the threshold
value of SBCI to be α/(1 + α).
The number of nodes in the network is taken as 1000,
which is reasonable size. However, the number of nodes
can be increased up to any number, but this will not affect
the results. Because, evaluation metrics are normalized with
respect to the number of nodes. The initial value of SBCI
of all the peers are taken as α/(1 + α). We conducted the
experiment for α = 0.9, 0.6 and 0.3. Percentage of free-
riders were varied from 10% to 80%.
The simulation is performed for three different peer dis-
tribution models, i.e., Simple, Adaptive and Extreme Model.
In Simple Model, free-riders vary from 10% - 70%. These
free-riders do not share anything at any point of time in the
simulation.
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1: procedure
2: if Peer i needs a resource then
3: Send the request for resource;
4: Get the SBCI of responding peers from their
respective index managers;
5: Learn about the bandwidth of responding peers;
6: Make the order of preference for uploader;
7: Send the order of preference to the resource man-
ager;
8: Get the ID of uploader partner from resource
manager;
9: Download the resource;
10: Send the value of resource to the index manager
of uploading peer;
11: end if
12: if Peer i get a request for a resource then
13: Get the SBCI of requesting peers from their re-
spective index managers;
14: Remove the peers, having SBCI less than the
threshold;
15: Make the order of preference according to their
SBCI;
16: Send the order of preference to the resource man-
ager;
17: Get the ID of downloader partner from resource
manager;
18: Upload the resource;
19: Send the value of resource to the index manager
of downloading peer;
20: end if
21: if Peer i is the resource manager then
22: Get the order of preference from uploaders;
23: Get the order of preference from downloaders;
24: Run the Stable marriage algorithm;
25: Send the ID of partner to each peer;
26: end if
27: end procedure
In Adaptive Model, free-riders vary from 20% - 60%.
Half of these free-riding peers do not share anything during
the whole simulation. Remaining half behave as normal
peers till midway of simulation, and thereafter convert
themselves to free-riders.
In Extreme Model, at the beginning of simulation, 10%
peers are free-riders. After completion of every 12.5% of to-
tal transactions, 10% more peers convert themselves to free-
riders. Thus, at the end of simulation, there will be 80% free-
riders. The simulation was run upto 100000 transactions.
6.2 Evaluation Metrics
We plotted the graph between the total upload and down-
load amounts of each peer for all the models. To get the
deeper picture, we also calculated the average absolute
deviation (AAD) of upload to download ratio from one, in
TABLE 1: AAD and % of Rejections for SBCI in Simple
Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection
S.N. α Free-riders AAD
% of
Rejections
1 0.9 10% 0.103772 1.817
2 0.9 30% 0.303675 0.127
3 0.9 50% 0.505119 0.023
4 0.9 70% 0.707233 0.008
5 0.6 10% 0.103667 0.064
6 0.6 30% 0.303652 0.009
7 0.6 50% 0.505459 0.006
8 0.6 70% 0.707117 0.003
9 0.3 10% 0.103844 0.009
10 0.3 30% 0.303671 0.002
11 0.3 50% 0.505088 0.001
12 0.3 70% 0.707069 0
any model as:
AAD = (1/N)
N∑
i=1
|1 − ei.Scomp(tn).e/ei.S
tr
comp(tn).e|.
If upload amount for each peer is same as download
amount, then the value of AAD in the network will be
zero. The larger value of AAD implies, the larger difference
between upload and download and thus, lesser fairness in
the network.
Network is said to be efficient if free-riders are not
allowed to download anything, without affecting the trans-
actions between non-free-rider peers. At any time, if SBCI
of any cooperative peer is less than the threshold then it
will also get rejected. This is not a desired state in the net-
work. Therefore, we calculated the percentage of rejections
among cooperative peers, i.e., cooperative peers rejecting
the request of cooperative peers. For efficient algorithm,
percentage of rejections must be minimum.
For comparison, we also simulated the GC for its best
case [4], i.e., α = 0.8 and β = 0.2. The parameters α and β
are taken to be same as in [4]. For fair comparison, we kept
the threshold value for peer selection as (2−α(1+β))/(2+
α(1−β)). We kept maximum value of threshold in both GC
as well as in SBCI. Rest of the settings for GC are same as in
SBCI.
6.3 Simulation Results of Simple Procedure For Peer
Selection
We conducted the simulation experiment for simple proce-
dure of peer selection, as explained in Section 5. Bandwidth
of all the peers is assumed to be same. For simple model,
simulation results for SBCI are shown in Fig. 2. Correspond-
ing AAD and percentage of rejections among cooperative
peers are shown in Table 1. We can observe from this figure
that in initial transactions, free-riders got some resources
after that their SBCI become zero, which disqualify them in
taking any resources from the network. For all other peers,
upload to download ratio is very close to the reference
line, thus algorithm is able to maintain the fairness in the
network. We can observe from Table 1 that the percentage of
rejections among the cooperative peers are more for higher
values of α. Because for higher values of α, threshold value
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(b) Free Riders = 10 %, α = 0.6
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(c) Free Riders = 10 %, α = 0.3
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(e) Free Riders = 30 %, α = 0.6
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(g) Free Riders = 50 %, α = 0.9
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(h) Free Riders = 50 %, α = 0.6
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(i) Free Riders = 50 %, α = 0.3
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(j) Free Riders = 70 %, α = 0.9
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 180000
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Upload Amount
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
 A
m
o
u
n
t
 
 
 Upload and Download at Each Peer
 Reference Line for Upload = Download
(k) Free Riders = 70 %, α = 0.6
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(l) Free Riders = 70 %, α = 0.3
Fig. 2: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer for SBCI in Simple Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection.
Free-riders are varied from 10%− 70% and the value of α is taken as 0.9, 0.6 and 0.3
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(a) Free Riders = 20 %, α = 0.9
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(b) Free Riders = 20 %, α = 0.6
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(c) Free Riders = 20 %, α = 0.3
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 180000
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Upload Amount
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
 A
m
o
u
n
t
 
 
 Upload and Download at Each Peer
 Reference Line for Upload = Download
(d) Free Riders = 40 %, α = 0.9
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(e) Free Riders = 40 %, α = 0.6
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(f) Free Riders = 40 %, α = 0.3
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(g) Free Riders = 60 %, α = 0.9
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(h) Free Riders = 60 %, α = 0.6
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(i) Free Riders = 60 %, α = 0.3
Fig. 3: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer for SBCI in Adaptive Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection.
Free-riders are varied from 20%− 60% and the value of α is taken as 0.9, 0.6 and 0.3
TABLE 2: AAD and % of Rejections for SBCI in Adaptive
Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection
S.N. α Free-riders AAD
% of
Rejections
1 0.9 20% 0.118469 1.87
2 0.9 40% 0.236766 0.606
3 0.9 60% 0.354868 0.198
4 0.6 20% 0.175055 0.054
5 0.6 40% 0.351099 0.028
6 0.6 60% 0.527092 0.011
7 0.3 20% 0.200618 0.020
8 0.3 40% 0.401786 0.011
9 0.3 60% 0.600657 0.008
of SBCI will be higher. But its impact on AAD is not very
significant in this model.
In Adaptive Model, free-riders earn the SBCI and there-
after use this SBCI to download maximum resources from
the network. Simulation results for this model are shown
in Fig. 3. Corresponding AAD and percentage of rejections
among cooperative peers are shown in Table 2. We can ob-
serve from this figure that for higher α, algorithm performs
better. For α = 0.9, even in the presence of a large number
of free-riders, the algorithm is able to balance the upload
and download amount in the network. We can also observe
from Table 2 that for higher α the percentage of rejection
among cooperative peers is higher but corresponding AAD
is very less. Thus, impact of α is clearly evident.
And finally, we conducted the simulation for SBCI in Ex-
treme Model. Results for upload and download at each peer
are shown in Fig. 4. Corresponding AAD and percentage of
rejections among cooperative peers are shown in Table 3. We
can observe from the figure that for α = 0.9 the algorithm
is able to balance the upload and download amount in the
network. For α = 0.9, at the cost of less than 2% of rejections
among the cooperative peers, algorithm is able to maintain
AAD as 0.211228.
We also reported the simulation results of GC for all
peer distribution models in Fig. 5. Corresponding AAD
and percentage of rejections among cooperative peers are
reported in Table 4. We can see from the figure that GC
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(a) Free Riders = 80%, α = 0.9
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(b) Free Riders = 80%, α = 0.6
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(c) Free Riders = 80%, α = 0.3
Fig. 4: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer for SBCI in Extream Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection.
At the beginning of simulation, 10% peers are free-riders. After completion of every 12.5% of total transactions, 10% more
peers convert themselves to free-riders. The value of α is taken as 0.9, 0.6 and 0.3
TABLE 3: AAD and % of Rejections for SBCI in Simple
Model for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection
S.N. α Free-riders AAD
% of
Rejections
1 0.9 80% 0.211228 1.794
2 0.6 80% 0.423116 0.068
3 0.3 80% 0.567303 0.010
TABLE 4: AAD and % of Rejections for Different Distribu-
tion Model in Best case of GC for Simple Procedure of Peer
Selection
S.N. Model
Free-
riders
AAD
% of
Rejections
1 Simple 30% 0.3059 33.657
2 Adaptive 60% 0.3146 16.27
3 Extreme 80% 0.1370 19.269
can also balance the upload and download amounts in
each peer. In Adaptive Model and in Extreme Model GC
can maintain better fairness compared to SBCI but the
percentage of rejections among cooperative peers are higher
in GC for all the models. Thus, it is less efficient compared
to SBCI.
TABLE 5: AAD and % of Rejections for SBCI in Simple
Model for Stable merriage approach with two different
bandwith peers
S.N. α Free-riders AAD
% of
Rejections
1 0.9 10% 0.102265 1.0114
2 0.9 30% 0.301927 0.287
3 0.9 50% 0.501482 0.0244
4 0.9 70% 0.701471 0.0026
5 0.6 10% 0.102312 0.046
6 0.6 30% 0.30196 0.0134
7 0.6 50% 0.50149 0.0034
8 0.6 70% 0.701432 0.0008
9 0.3 10% 0.102367 0.0114
10 0.3 30% 0.301967 0.0036
11 0.3 50% 0.501484 0.0016
12 0.3 70% 0.701441 0
TABLE 6: AAD and % of Rejections for SBCI in Simple
Model for Stable merriage approachwith ten different band-
with peers
S.N. α Free-riders AAD
% of
Rejections
1 0.9 10% 0.131826 6.1534
2 0.9 30% 0.322511 4.2034
3 0.9 50% 0.515015 2.3352
4 0.9 70% 0.709604 0.9604
5 0.6 10% 0.128717 0.4344
6 0.6 30% 0.327149 0.2746
7 0.6 50% 0.520278 0.1396
8 0.6 70% 0.710663 0.0348
9 0.3 10% 0.130575 0.1214
10 0.3 30% 0.323463 0.0652
11 0.3 50% 0.514418 0.024
12 0.3 70% 0.70845 0.0054
6.4 Simulation Results of College Admission and The
Stability of Marriage Based Approach For the Peer Se-
lection
We also conducted the experiment for college admission
and the stability of marriage based approach for the peer
selection. For simplicity, we considered only Simple model.
Bandwidth of peers is assumed to be different, so that
they can also include the bandwidth, as a criteria for peer
selection. Selection of peer for downloading and uploading
is done according to Algorithm 3. The stable match for
uploader and downloader is made downloader optimal.
To observe the impact of heterogeneity, we simulated the
Simple Model for two different types of bandwidth distri-
butions, i.e., type 1 and type 2.
In type 1, half of the peers have bandwidth 10 units and
the rest have 20 units. Simulation results for this type are
shown in Fig. 6. Corresponding AAD and percentage of
rejections among cooperative peers are shown in Table 5. We
can see from the figure that upload and download amount
increases in each peer compared to simple procedure. Be-
cause each peer, who request for resources, is getting some
option for downloading. Uploads and downloads in each
peer are close to the reference line and corresponding AAD
are lesser compared to simple procedure. Thus, the algo-
rithm is able to balance the upload and download amount
11
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(a) Simple Model, Free Riders = 30%
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(b) Adaptive Model, Free Riders = 60%
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(c) Extreme Model, Free Riders = 80%
Fig. 5: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer for best case of GC, i.e., α = 0.8, β = 0.2 in different distribution
models for Simple Procedure of Peer Selection.
in each peer.
In type 2, 10% of the peers have bandwidth 10 units,
next 10% of the peers have bandwidth 20 units, next 10%
of peers have bandwidth 30 units and so on. In this way,
last 10% of peers will have bandwidth 100 units. Simulation
results for this type are shown in Fig. 7. Corresponding
AAD and percentage of rejections among cooperative peers
are shown in Table 6. We can observe from this figure that
upload and download amounts for most of the peers are far
from reference line and corresponding AAD are also higher.
Thus, the impact of heterogeneity is clearly evident. It also
supports the argument that if we will select the source peer
according to bandwidth rather than SBCI, we will loose the
fairness in the network.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a new algorithm to make the P2P
network fair and efficient. The algorithm ranks the peers
based on their simplified biased contribution index (SBCI)
which can vary from 0 to 1. Estimation of SBCI is based on
two factors, the resources contributed by the peer and the
SBCI of peer with whom it is transacting. We propose the
design rules to make the network fair and efficient. With
the help of mathematical justification, we have shown that
our algorithm can fulfill all the design objectives and is able
to maintain the fairness in the network. This algorithm can
be implemented in the truly distributed fashion. Since, no
iterative calculation is needed, it can be implemented with
lesser message overhead and storage capacity.
We proposed two different peer selection approaches,
namely simple procedure and college admission and the
stability of marriage based approach. Simulation results
show that the algorithm is able to suppress the free-riders in
highly free-riding environment. The algorithm is also able
to suppress the dynamic free-riders, i.e., those who change
their behavior dynamically.
In future, we would like to implement this mechanism
in unstructured P2P network.
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Fig. 6: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer in the Presence of 10%−70% Free-riders for Different values of α. Peer
selection approach is based on the problem of ”College Admission and The Stability of Marriage”. Bandwidth distribution
is as type 1.
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Fig. 7: Upload and Download Amount at Each Peer in the Presence of 10%−70% Free-riders for Different values of α. Peer
selection approach is based on the problem of ”College Admission and The Stability of Marriage”. Bandwidth distribution
is as type 2.
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